By Cappetta Law Offices In a traditional case of negligence, the fact that the Defendant did a bad act is not necessarily enough for the Plaintiff to recover sums of money.
Previous studies mostly investigated these behaviors in gain rather than loss context, and few study made direct comparison between these two behaviors. We conducted three experiments to investigate third-party punishment and third-party compensation in the gain and loss context.
Participants observed two persons playing Dictator Game to share an amount of gain or loss, and the proposer would propose unfair distribution sometimes. In Study 1A, participants should decide whether they wanted to punish proposer. In Study 1B, participants decided to compensate the recipient or to do nothing.
This two experiments explored how gain and loss contexts might affect the willingness to altruistically punish a perpetrator, or to compensate a victim of unfairness. Results suggested that both third-party punishment and compensation were stronger in the loss context.
Study 2 directly compare third-party punishment and third-party compensation in the both contexts, by allowing participants choosing between punishment, compensation and keeping. Participants chose compensation more often than punishment in the loss context, and chose more punishments in the gain context.
Empathic concern partly explained between-context differences of altruistic compensation and punishment. Our findings provide insights on modulating effect of context on third-party altruistic decisions.
Introduction The existence of human society is based on social norms, and the ability to develop and enforce social norms is approximately one of the obvious features of the human species.
However, the violation of social norms often occurred, e.
A notable fact is that norm compliance depends not Compensate the victim or punish the on the economic self-interest frequently served by collaboration and exchange conducted in a fairly manner, but also on the credible threat of consequences which are not welcome for defection Spitzer et al.
For instance, previous studies have shown that when people experienced an unfair economic distribution, they are willing to enforce the fair norms by punishing violator even at substantial personal costs Boyd et al.
In lab researches, the ultimatum game UG has been frequently used to investigate such second-party punishment toward unfairness. In the UG, two players work together to split a sum of money.
One player proposes how to split it and the other one responds i. The responder can either accept or reject the offer. The acceptance leads to the suggested division of money, whereas the rejection results in both players receiving nothing. It is worth noting that unfairness and injustice not only took place in the case of gains, but also in the case of losses.
These works have revealed that subjective perception of social norm violations, fairness considerations as well as the second-party punishment decision to reject were modulated by the context of gain or loss.
In particular, participants were likely to perceive higher unfairness level and have stronger desire to sanction social norm violations in the loss context than in the gain context Zhou and Wu, ; Guo et al. In real life, however, the maintenance of social norms was fulfilled not only through responses of the second-party, but also through actions by third parties.
In fact, modern societies administer third-party behaviors to enforce social norms, by way of state-empowered legal system authorizing those unprejudiced third-party decision makers who are not influenced in a direct way by the norm violation and who do not have personal stake in the enforcement.
For example, the distinctive third-party punishment was meted out in some social dilemmas when uninvolved third-parties witnessed injustices, which were frequently regarded as a transgression of normally held social norms such as the equal division rule Messick, In order to study third-party behaviors toward norm violations, most researchers asked participants to observe some economic decision-making tasks being played between two persons.
Among them, one popular task is the dictator game DG Lotz et al.
Participants observed the DG as third-parties. In the third-party punishment tasks, participants might choose to punish the proposer following observation of an unfair distribution. When carrying out third-party punishments, third-parties voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of social norms.
After inflicting punishment, violators to social norms were obliged to pay money, and the difference between the final outcome of the violators and their victims were decreased.
Notably, although studies on second-party punishment has proved that punishment toward unfairness could be modulated by the context of gain of loss, few research has considered how third-party actions toward unfairness might be affected by gain or loss context. When investigating third-party decision-making with economic games such as DG, most studies laid stress on economic game tasks in the gain domain i.
In the present study, we tried to explore whether third-party behaviors would be modulated in the loss context.
There are some important discrepancies between second- and third-party responses toward social norm violations. As a second-party, the only choice to maintain fair norms is to reject or punish the proposer. However, third-party punishment and third-party compensation are likely to be motivated differently.
The objective of punishment lies in just deserts, punishment can also be used to prohibit offenders from norm violations in the future Carlsmith et al.
As another measure coming to grips with inequality, compensation has a variety of underlying motivations. Thus, when investigating how gain or loss context might affect third-party maintenance of social norms, it is necessary to study both third-party punishment and third-party compensation simultaneously.
Besides, another major discrepancy between third-party punishment and third-party compensation is that they aim to different targets.
Third-party punishment is deployed to norm violators, while third-party compensation is targeting on victims of norm violations. Hence, the empathy for victims were peculiarly connected with the decision of third-party compensation.
Empathy functions as the major proximal determinant of prosocial motivations Lee and Murnighan,and it has been proved as being linked with third-party altruistic behaviors.Every crime produces a victim(s).
The victims are generally considered as mere informants or witnesses in criminal trials, assisting the State in its endeavor to punish offenders, are now becoming the focal points of our criminal justice system. Victim compensation is an important discussion in this article. At times, punishment of the offender is the only way to go, and other times it may make sense to put the victim in the center of the process and follow their lead.
They each have their place. Thank you . “In this study we show that victims actually prefer other forms of justice restoration, such as compensation to the victim, rather than punishment of the transgressor.” “These results differ from the majority of findings on social punishment,” adds co-author Jay Van Bavel, a .
In law, damages are an award, typically of money, to be paid to a person as compensation for loss or injury. The rules for damages can and frequently do vary based on the type of claim which is presented (e.g., breach of contract versus a tort claim) and the jurisdiction..
At common law, damages are categorized into compensatory (or actual) damages, and punitive damages. The Paths of Forgiveness. Understanding when to forgive, the effect it can have on ourselves and the offender, and its relationships to apology helps us to manage our relationships and feelings.
The following figure illustrates choices we have and paths we can take to either prolong or resolve our hurt. “In this study we show that victims actually prefer other forms of justice restoration, such as compensation to the victim, rather than punishment of the transgressor.” “These results differ from the majority of findings on social punishment,” adds co-author Jay Van Bavel, a professor in NYU’s Department of Psychology.